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nuisance.9 Where such an establishment is located in an exclusively
residential district, some courts have held that even when so located with
the result that because of sentimental repugnance on the part of those
who might reside near it, property values in the vicinity would depreciate,
the establishment would not be enjoined.1O The courts advancing this theory
are those of Oregon, Kentucky and New Jersey.
In California it was held that maintainence of an undertaking parlor in
a residential district where it was not shown that foul and obnoxious
odors, or danger of infectious diseases was present, but only a disturbance
of quiet enjoyment and resultant mental and physical depression would
not be enjoined under the California Civil Code."1
The above cases, however, appear to be in the minority, and by what
appears to be the great weight of modern authority, and in accord with
the decision in the principal case, it is held that the location of such a
business in a residential district is sufficiently objectionable to make it a
nuisance. 12 The theory upon which these courts base their decisions is
that the inherent nature of an undertaking establishment is such that, if
located in a residential district, it will inevitably create an atmosphere
detrimental to the use and enjoyment of residential property, produce
material annoyance and inconvenience to the occupants of adjacent dwell-
ings and render them physically uncomfortable. Therefore, in the absence
of a strong showing of public necessity, its location in such a district
should not be permitted over the protest of those who would be materially
injured thereby.1S
It is a clear deduction from the opinions cited that there is a growing
tendency of the courts, through the superior relief afforded by equity, to
protect the average aesthetic and cultural side of human life as centered
in the home, even where such a tendency comes in conflict with the forward
march of business enterprise. As the Wisconsin court said in State ex rel.
Carter v. Harper, 14 "The rights of property should not be sacrificed to the
pleasure of an ultra-aesthetic taste. But whether they should be permitted
to plague the average or dominant human sensibilities well may be
pondered." R. S. 0.
RIGHT OF A BANK TO PL~mGE ITS ASSETS AS SECU~niY FOR A Punic DE-
Posrr-The directors of a bank organized under the laws of Indiana as-
9 Higgins v. Block (1924), 216 Ala. 153, 192 So. 739; Bragg v. Ives (1927), 149
V. 482, 140 S. E. 656.
loStoddard v. Snodgrass (1925), 117 Or. 262, 241 Pac. 73, 43 A. L. R. 1160;
i. D. Pearson and Son v. Bonnie (1925), 209 Ky. 307, 272 S. W. 375; Westcott v.
Middleton (1887), 43 N. J. Eq. 478, 11 Atl. 490.
11 Dean v. Powell Undertaking Co. (1922), 55 Cal. App. 545, 203 Pac. 1015.
1Cunningham v. Miller (1922), 178 Wis. 22, 189 N. W. 531; Sair v. Joy (1917),
198 Mich. 295, 164 N. W. 507; Dillon v. Moran (1926), 237 Mich. 130, 211 N. W. 67;
Beisel v. Crosby (1920). 104 Neb. 643, 178 N. W. 272; Meagher v. Kessler (1920),
147 Minn. 182, 179 N. W. 732; Osborn v. City of Ohreveport (1918), 143 La. 932,
79 So. 542; Jordan v. Nesmith (1928), 132 Okl. 226, 269 Pac. 1096; Meldahl v.
Holberg (1927), 55 N. W. 523, 214 N. W. 802; Turrelin v. Ketterlin (1924), 304
Mo. 221, 263 S. W. 202; Leland v. Turner (1924), 117 Kan 294, 230 Pac. 1061; City
of St. Paul v. Kessler (1920), 178 N. W. 171, 146 Minn. 124; Arthur v. Virkler
(1932), 258 N. Y. S. 886, 144 Misc. 483.
IsCooley, Torts (1932, 4th ed.), vol. 3, sec. 435.
14 (1923), 182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451.
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signed promissory notes which were part of the assets of the bank to cer-
tain stockholders and directors of the bank to indemnify them on a personal
surety bond given for the purpose of securing deposits of public funds
according tp statute. The notes were left with the bank so that as the
notes were paid by the makers, other notes of like amount could-be sub-
stituted. At the time of the pledging of the notes, the bank was insolvent
and subsequently a receiver took possession of the assets including the
notes so pledged. The sureties, having been forced to pay on their bond,
requested the receiver to turn over the notes so pledged, and upon his
refusal this suit was brought for their recovery. No fraud or bad faith
on the part of the bank in pledging the notes was shown. Held, that a
bank had the power to so pledge such assets.'
Under the public depository act,2 it is provided that a bank may secure
a public deposit by presenting to the board of finance personal or surety
company bonds, or in lieu of them, the bonds of any county of this state,
bonds issued by any county of this state for the improvement of roads, or
bonds of the United States. It is obvious in this instance, that the bank
did not pledge such assets for security as are specifically named in the
act. And thus the legality of such a pledge depends on whether the
judiciary deems the pledging of assets to secure deposits as odious or
desirable. For if we begin with the premise that the pledging of assets
to secure a deposit is odious, then it follows that the bank may pledge
only such assets as are set out in the act. But if on the other hand, we
begin with the premise that such pledging is desirable, then it is immaterial
what assets are pledged as long as the public funds are protected according
to the act. Therefore, we arrive at the conclusion that the act is no guide
and the question must be solved as if there was none on the subject.s
The question whether a bank may pledge its assets to secure a public
deposit has frequently been before the courts for determination The
authorities, outside of statutory authorization, are in sharp conflict; the
numerical weight of authority being that the bank has the right to pledge
its assets to secure a public deposit,4 although the more recent and seem-
ingly better considered cases hold to the contrary.s The majority view
I Schornick v. Butler et al. (1933), 186 N. E. 326 denying petition for rehearing
of former opinion in 185 N. E. 111 superceding previous opinion In 172 N. E. 181.
$Burns (1926) sections 12621 and 12622.
279 U. Pa. L. Rev. 608 (a comprehensive note).
'Williams v. Hall (1926), 30 Ariz. 581, 249 Pac. 755; Andrew v. Odebolt Sav-
ings Bank (1927), 203 Iowa 1336, 214 N. W. 559; McFerson v. National Surety
Co. (1923), 72 Colo. 482, 212 Pac. 489; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Village
of Bassfield (1927), 148 Miss. 109, 114 So. 26; Ainsworth v. Kruger (1927), 80
Mont. 468, 260 Fac. 1055; Page Trust Co. v. Rose (1926), 192 N. C. 673, 135 S. E.
795; Grigsby v. Peoples' Bank (1928), 158 Tenn. 182, 11 S. W. (2nd) 673; Ward v.
Johnson (1880), 95 Ill. 215; Cameron v. Christy (.1926), 286 Pa. 405, 133 A. 551.
&Arkansas-Loulslana Highway Improvement Dist. v. Taylor (1928), 177 Ark.
440, 6 S. W. (2nd) 533; Commercial Banking and Trust Co. v. Citizens' Trust and
G. Co. (1913). 153 Ky. 566, 156 S. W. 160; Farmers and M. State Bank v. Consoli-
dated School Dist. (1928), 174 Minn. 286, 219 N. W. 163; Farmers State Bank v.
Marshall County (1928), 175 Minn. 363, 221 N. W. 242; Divide County v. Baird
(1927), 55 N. D. 45, 212 N. W. 236; Foster v. City of Longvlew (1930), 26 S. W.
(2nd) 1059, (Texas); Austin v. County of Lamar (Texas 1930), 26 S. W. (2nd)
1062; Schornick v. Butler et al. (1930), 172 N. E. 181 (well reasoned opinion of
the case under discussion) ; Parks v. Knapp (C. C. A. 1928), 29 F. (2nd) 547 (dicta
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and the one adopted by the Indiana court expound three reasons why
such a pledge should be upheld and these three reasons will be taken up
in order.
First, the courts have used the following syllogism. A4 bank may
pledge its assets to secure a loan, a deposit is a loan, and therefore a
bank may pledge its assets to secure a deposit.6 It is conceded that a bank
has the power to borrow money and to hypothecate its assets in order to
secure a loan,7 but to say that a loan and a deposit are one and the same
thing is not correct. A real difference between a deposit and a loan has
always been assumed, as a matter of custom in the banking business itself,
and in all legislation dealing with the subject.S The writer is cognizant
of the Indiana case9 holding that there is no distinction between a loan
and a deposit but the error in such reasoning is obvious. A bank is
allowed to accept loans of money although knowing of its insolvencylo and
if there is no distinction between a loan and a deposit, then a bank can
receive deposits when conscious of its insolvency, although in contravention
to statute expressly prohibiting such a procedure."1 It is true that both
a deposit and a loan gives rise to the relation of debtor and creditor,12 but
that does not mean that they are the same thing. A deposit is a transac-
tion peculiar to the banking business and one that the courts should recog-
nize and deal with according to commercial usage and understanding. The
parties deal with each other on a basis, not merely that of borrower and
lender, but on the basis that the party receiving the money is a bank
organized under the law and subject to the provisions of the law and in
the belief that such provisions respecting the custody of the deposit will
be observed.13 Further, in their inception, the two are different; the
in accord) ; Bliss v. Pathfinder Irrigation Dist. (1932), 122 Neb. 203, 240 N. W. 291;
State Bank of Commerce of Brockport v. Stone (1933), 261 N. Y. 175, 184 N. E.
750; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff (C. C. A. 1933), 63 F. (2nd) 1; Smith v.
Baltimore & 0. R. Co. et al. (D. C. 1931), 48 F. (2nd) 861 and affirmed (C. C. A.
1932) 56 F. (2nd) 801; United States Senate Report No. 67, 71 Cong. Second
session; 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 608; 42 Harv. L. Rev. 272; 22 Ill. L. Rev. 449; 41 Yale
L. J. 1076; 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 916; 18 St. Louis L. Rev. 259.
6 Schornick v. Butler et al. (Indiana Supreme Court 1933), 186 N. E. 326;
Williams v. Hall (1926), 30 Ariz. 581, 249 Pac. 755; Grigsby v. Peoples' Bank
(1928), 158 Tenn. 182, 11 S. W. (2nd) 673.
'Coats v. Donell (1883), 94 N. Y. 168; Sibley State Bank v. Ex-change Na-
tional Bank (1925), 159 La. 214, 105 So. 294; Harris v. Randolph County Bank
(1901), 157 Ind. 120, 60 N. E. 1025; Citizens' Bank v. Waddy Bank, 126 Ky. 169,
103 S. W. 249.
sDivide County v. Baird (1927), 55 N. D. 45, 212 N. W. 236; Carter v. Brock
(1926), 162 La. 12, 110 So. 71; 27 Col. L. Rev. 88.
9 Harris v. Randolph County Bank (1901), 157 Ind. 120, 60 N. E. 1025.
10 See Chief Justice Treanor's dissent to case under discussion in 185 N. E. at
page 113.
"Burns (1926), section 2479.
3'Union National Bank v. Citizen's Bank (1899), 153 Ind. 44, 54 N. E. 97;
Shofert v. Indiana National Bank (1908), 41 Ind. App. 474, 83 N. E. 515; Olinge
v. Sanders (1931), 92 Ind. App. 358, 174 N. E. 513.
'-3Boyd et al. v. Schneider et al. (C. C. A. 1904), 131 F. 223; Elliott v. Capital
City State Bank (Iowa 1905), 103 N. W. 777; Farmers and Merchants State Bank
v. Consolidated School Dist. (1928), 174 Minn. 286, 219 N. W. 163; Arkansas-
Louisiana Highway Improvement Dist. v. Taylor (1928), 177 Ark. 440, 6 S. W.
(2nd) 533; Leach v. Bazely (1926), 201 Iowa 337, 207 N. W. 374; Allibone v.
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lender deals with the bank reasonably supposing that the bank is in press-
ing circumstances or it would not have demanded his aid, while a depositor
entrusts the bank with his money depending upon its apparent solvency
and ability to repay.14
Secondly, the courts adopting the majority view have said that the
private depositor has no reason to complain as the amount received as a
deposit is equal, if not more, than the assets hypothecated, thus they are
benefited by having the bank more liquid, inasmuch as it has now cash
rather than securities.15 While this reasoning is at first tinged with a
semblance of persuasion, it is not very satisfactory after further examina-
tion. As long as the bank is solvent, there is little fault to find with such
a pledge, but the validity of it'is never assailed until the bank has become
insolvent. And in that event, it means that the repayment of the secured
deposit will be insured by the other and unsecured depositors, for mani-
festly, a pledge, in the event of insolvency, would reduce the assets avail-
able to pay the general depositors by the amount or value of the pledged
securities.16
Lastly, it is argued that it is not against public policy for a bank to
pledge it as assets to secure a deposit.' 7 But it is indeed difficult to com-
prehend that a scheme whereby large depositors, if secured, might absorb
a large part of the assets of a bank, inflicting loss upon unsecured deposi-
tors, and a scheme, the publicity of which the bank could not stand, is not
against public policy. For if it were known that a bank was in such a
practice, no prudent person would deposit his money therein without
security, and the very fact that the transaction cannot stand the test of
publicity is a strong argument against its legality.1 8 The laws have been
framed to secure a fair, honest, and uniform dealing by the bank with all
its depositors and a practice whereby the favored few would be protected
at the expense of the equally deserving others should not be tolerated.19
Ames (1896), 9 S. D. 74, 68 N. W. 165; Law's Estate (1S91), 144 Pa. 499, 22 Atl.
S31; Foster v. City of Longvlew (Texas 1930), 26 S. W. (2nd) 1059.
"Farmers and Merchants State Bank v. School Dist. (1928), 174 Minn. 286,
219 N. W. 163; Hunt v. Hopley (1903), 120 Iowa 695, 95 N. W. 205; 18 St. Louis L.
Rev. 256.
3rPage Trust Co. v. Rose (1926), 192 N. C. 673, 133 S. E. 795; Grigsby v. Peo-
ple's Bank (1928), 158 Tenn. 182, 11 S. W. (2nd) 673; Schornick v. Butler et al.
(Ind. 1933), 1S6 N. E. 326.
16Smith v. Baltimore and 0. Ry. Co. et al. (D. C. 1931), 48 Fed. (2nd) 861,
affirmed in (C. C. A. 1932), 56 Fed. (2nd) 801; Divide County v. Baird (1927), 55
N. D. 45, 212 N. W. 236; Commercial Bank and Trust Co. v. Citizen's Trust and
Guaranty Co. (1913), 153 Ky. 566, 156 S. W. 160; Hougen, The Right of Banks
to Pledge Their Assets to Secure General Deposits (1923), 2 Dak. L. J. 68; 2 Dak.
L. J. 258.
"7Divide County v. Baird (1927), 55 N. D. 45, 212 N. W. 236; Commercial
Bank and Trust Co. v. Citizens' Trust and Guaranty Co. (1913), 153 Xy. 566, 156
S. W. 160; Schornick v. Butler et al. (Ind. 1933), 136 N. E. 326; Cameron v.
Christy (1926), 286 Pa. 405, 133 AtI. 551; Grigsby v. Peoples Bank (1928), 158
Tenn. 132, 11 S. W. (2nd) 673.
" Divide County v. Baird (1927), 55 N. D. 45, 212 N. W. 236; Commercial
Bank and Trust Co. v. Citizens' Trust and Guaranty Co. (1913), 153 Ky. 566, 156
,. W. 160.
9 Commercial Bank and Trust Co. v. Citizens' Trust and Guaranty Co. (1913),
153 Ky. 566, 156 S. W. 160; 22 BI. L. Rev. 449.
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Thus, when a legislative act is susceptible of a dual construction, one of
which secures equality and fair dealing and the other paves the way to
the perpetration of fraud, no court should hesitate to adopt that construc-
tion insuring fair dealing.20
The Indiana court also goes on to say that for a disclosure of the public
policy of the state, legislative enactments are the safest guides and the
fairest in that they operate prospectively and as a guide to future negotia-
tions.21 Such statement is taken without objection for if we are to examine
the legislative intent, made manifest in the statutes governing the business
of banking, we would find that practically every possible safeguard is
thrown up around the rights of the general depositors; as for instance,
criminal liability of officers of bank fraudulently receiving deposits while
insolvent, 22 double liability of stockholders,23 provision for publication of
sworn statements as to the bank's condition made at regular intervals,2 4
stipulation that assignments with a view of preferring creditors are
void,25 and a requirement that a surplus fund should be kept.26 As all
important functions of the banks are carefully limited and regulated so
as to enable complete examinations by state examiners, it would be unrea-
sonable to assume that the legislature would recognize the existence of so
vital a power as that to pledge assets to secure deposits and yet fail to
provide for its supervision.2T
The same reasoning and argument should be applicable to the pledging
of assets to secure deposits of individuals and private corporations. In
fact, the writer is of the opinion that the pledging in these instances
would be more odious than in the ease of public deposits because of the
more probable collusion between the depositor and the officials of the
bank. In recent years, statutes have been passed in various states to the
effect that a pledge of assets by a bank to secure a private depositor is
void.28 But it would seem that such a result should be reached without a
statute and the majority of the recent cases have so held.29
In conclusion, the writer wishes to state, that although he is fully cog-
nizant of the authority supporting the decision in the instant case, yet he
feels that the contrary view is more in line with business practices and
with the manifest public policy to protect the small depositor. S. E. M.
20Commercial Bank and Trust Co. v. Citizens' Trust and Guaranty Co. (1913),
153 Ky. 566, 156 S. W. 160.
2 Schornick v. Butler et al. (Ind. 1933), 185 N. E. 111.
2Burns (1926) section 2479.
2Burns (1926) section 3858.
5
'Burns (1926) section 3870.2 Burns (1926) section 3866.
mBurns (1926) section 3867.
22 Ill. L, Rev. 449.
2Idaho Sess. Laws (1925) c. 133, No. 39; Minn. Laws (1927) c. 257; N. D.
Laws (1925) c. 92, No. 1; S. D. Laws (1919) c 124, p. 109; Ore. Sess. Laws (1921)
c. 17, p. 45; Utah Comp. Laws (1917), No. 1006; Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) c. 9,
No. 142.
2Parks v. Knapp (C. C. A. 1928), 29 Fed. (2nd) 547 (dicta); State Bank of
Commerce of Bropksport v. Stone (1933), 261 N. Y. 175, 184 N. E. 750; Texas &
P. Ry. v. Pottorff (C. C. A. 1933), 63 Fed. (2nd) 1; Smith v. Baltimore & 0. R. R.
(D. C. 1931), 48 Fed. (2nd) 861, affirmed in (C. C. A. 1932) 56 Fed. (2nd) 799.
